Not too long ago - within the past 2 or 3 days - I had a brilliant idea for a post, related to "decapitation" as a failed tactic in Iraq. It was motivated by some non-Iraq reference - but for life of me I can't remember what that reference was. An episode of "Law and Order"? A newpaper article? Who knows?
[note: whether it's age, or alcohol, or past use of 'other drugs', I notice more and more frequently that I walk into a room and ask myself, "Why did I come here?"]
The decapitation theme is still valid, even if I can't recall the brilliant analogy.
Much of our Iraq "strategy" has been based on the assumption that if we just get the head, the body will die.
The biggest coup was capturing Saddam. We assumed this would end the insurgency. It didn't.
We issued a clever 52-card deck of "most wanteds", assuming that when we caught these guys, all would be well. It wasn't.
We hailed the killing of al-Zarqawi as ending the the threat of the so-called "al Qaeda in Iraq". It didn't.
I think there's a lesson here: popular insurgencies don't die with the death of the presumed leader. They are popular - etymologically, "of the people".
We've never understood our enemies. This is not good.
Stop the madness!
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